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Abstract
We investigate theoretically and empirically the relationship between capital taxa-
tion and economic growth. Using a long cross-country panel data set going back to
1965 and employing a variety of econometric techniques, we document that greater
reliance on capital taxation, measured in different ways, is not negatively associated
with growth rates. Exploring potential heterogeneity in this relationship across coun-
tries, we find that capital taxation and growth rates tend to be positively related for
developed countries, but for developing countries the relationship is in most cases
statistically insignificant. To rationalize these empirical findings we propose a multi-
country innovation-based growth model where innovations spill over from leading to
lagging economies. In the context of this model we demonstrate that positive rates
of capital taxation can increase the long-run growth rate in leading economies where
the engine of growth is domestic innovation activity. However, this is not the case in
lagging economies where growth is driven by imitation of existing innovations from
the technology frontier.
Keywords Capital taxation · Economic growth · Innovation · Technology transfer ·
Tax structure
JEL Classification E60 · H20 · O40
1 Introduction
Since the global financial crisis of 2007–2008 questions related to public finance have
returned to the forefront of economic policy debates. This is particularly the case in
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public finances back on a sustainable track in an environment of high public debt
and slow economic growth. In the context of such debates, both the level and the
structure of taxation have been the subject of scrutiny and some taxation principles of
the pre-crisis years have been called into question.
One such principle, that has sparked extensive discussions in the literature, has to
do with the taxation of capital. Before the crisis, tax rates on capital in most developed
countries were on a declining path, as tax competition between countries contributed
to a shift of the tax burden away from capital (Devereux et al. 2008). Since the crisis,
however, there have been multiple calls to increase taxes on capital (Piketty 2014;
Stiglitz 2012) and several international organizations appear less concerned about this
form of taxation than before (European Commission 2015; International Monetary
Fund 2015).
The case of capital taxation is particularly interesting since economic theory pro-
vides a strong prescription, namely that in the long-run capital should be taxed at a
zero rate. The rationale for not imposing any taxes on capital follows from the basic
principles of uniform taxation of final goods (Atkinson and Stiglitz 1976) and non-
taxation of intermediate goods (Diamond and Mirrlees 1971). In its clearest form, this
proposition has been documented by Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985), and thus is
often referred to as the Chamley–Judd result. As shown in these two papers, any pos-
itive tax rate on capital will distort the intertemporal allocation of resources between
consumption and savings, discourage savings and lead to less capital accumulation.
This distortion is so large that, as Mankiw (2000) stresses, any capital income taxation
is suboptimal compared to labor income taxation, even from the perspective of an
individual with no savings. While, following the work of Chamley and Judd, several
authors have investigated the generality of the result and raised important qualifica-
tions to it1 the conventional wisdom among economists, summarized in Mankiw et al.
(2009), remains that optimal tax rates on capital should be close to zero.
In light of these conclusions stemming from economic theory, a natural question
that emerges is whether countries that have deviated from this policy prescription
have indeed experienced lower rates of economic growth. We investigate this question
using the detailed information on taxation provided by the OECD Revenue Statistics,
one of the few databases that report not only the overall level of taxation in different
countries, but also the composition in terms of different forms of taxation. Moreover,
the database includes annual observations and spans a relatively long period, from
1965 to 2014. This is particularly important, as it allows us to exploit changes in tax
policies over time. The data also extend beyond current OECD members to cover
several developing countries from Asia, Africa and Latin America.
Combining these data with standard national accounts data from the Penn World
Table, we assess whether and to what extent greater reliance on capital taxation is
harmful for economic growth. We perform this assessment using a variety of econo-
metric techniques. These include the standard fixed-effect panel regressions, as well
as the panel error-correction techniques developed by Pesaran et al. (1999). The latter
allow us to exploit the annual frequency of our data and separate the short-run from
the long-run impact of capital taxation. To eliminate potential endogeneity concerns,
1 See Sect. 2 for more details.
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due to feedback from economic growth on the tax structure as well as due to possible
omitted variables, we also document estimation results using the difference and the
system generalized methods of moment (GMM) estimators proposed by Arellano and
Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998), respectively.
The results that we obtain do not support the standard theory prescriptions. We find
that shifts in the tax burden toward capital, conditional on the overall level of taxation,
do not systematically reduce rates of economic growth. In many specifications, the
association between capital taxation and growth rates is in fact positive and in the
remaining ones it is not statistically different from zero. We then explore whether the
estimated effect is potentially heterogeneous across countries. Separating the countries
based on their level of development, we provide evidence that the association between
capital taxation and growth tends to be more positive in high-income countries in
our sample and less positive or even negative in low-income countries. We further
document that these empirical findings are robust to the specific measure of capital
taxation that we employ, to the exact way we distinguish between high- and low-
income countries and to the inclusion of other variables that influence the relationship
between capital taxation and economic growth as controls.
To rationalize our empirical findings, we propose a variant of the multi-country
innovation-based growth model of Aghion and Howitt (1992). The model allows for
capital accumulation so that we can analyze the link between capital taxation and
innovation, which is the main engine of growth in the model. It also incorporates
technology transfer, as in Aghion et al. (2005) and Acemoglu et al. (2006), with
innovations produced in leading economies spilling over to lagging economies. In the
model, there are two channels through which capital taxation can influence economic
growth. The first is by shifting the tax burden away from labor taxation, which reduces
the market size for new innovations and has an adverse effect on domestic rates of
innovation. The second one is by financing productive government spending, which
raises the productivity of innovating firms.
Using this model, we study the effects of capital taxation on the long-run equilib-
rium level and the growth rate of output for different economies which vary in their
proximity to the technology frontier. As our analysis demonstrates, starting from a
benchmark equilibrium with zero capital taxation, a shift to positive capital taxation
can increase the long-run growth rate, either when this comes with a corresponding
reduction in labor taxation or when the additional tax revenue is used to finance pro-
ductive government spending. These effects, however, apply only in the case of leading
economies which actively engage in innovation. This is because in leading economies
lower labor taxation and more productive government spending increase the rate of
long-run growth by stimulating innovation. In the case of lagging economies, there is
no innovation taking place domestically and economic growth is driven by the imitation
of existing innovations developed in leading economies. Thus, any change in capital
taxation does not alter the ability of the country to tap on the existing global stock of
innovations or the long-run rate of economic growth, which is effectively exogenous.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief sum-
mary of the theoretical and empirical literature investigating the relationship between
capital taxation and economic growth. Section 3 discusses our data set as well as our
empirical strategy. Section 4 reports our regression results. Section 5 presents our the-
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oretical model, while Sect. 6 describes the equilibrium of the model. Lastly, Sect. 7
offers some concluding remarks and discusses some policy implications.
2 Literature review
Most of the literature on capital taxation and economic growth originates from the
seminal theoretical contributions of Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986). Within the
framework of the standard optimal growth model of Ramsey (1928), Cass (1965) and
Koopmans (1965), both authors demonstrate that the taxation of capital has strong
negative effects on capital accumulation and ultimately leads to a lower level of capital
and output. This implies that in equilibrium capital should be taxed at a zero rate, a
conclusion that, although striking, is general and robust to different specifications. As
shown by Atkeson et al. (1999), the Chamley–Judd result will naturally emerge in any
model where taxes are restricted to be linear and the government is assumed to be
benevolent and unable to commit to future taxes.2
These results also extend to several endogenous growth models, as exemplified
by Jones et al. (1993), Milesi-Ferretti and Roubini (1998) and Aghion et al. (2013).
Within this class of models, though, there are setups in which the optimal tax rate on
capital may differ from zero. As Jones et al. (1993) demonstrate, capital taxation may
be growth enhancing if the resulting revenue is used to fund productive government
spending. Similarly, Aghion et al. (2013) show that in an innovation-based growth
model, taxing capital can increase growth rates by allowing the government to limit the
adverse effect of high labor taxation. Innovation-based growth models also imply that
different forms of capital taxation can have different effects on growth. Peretto (2003),
for example, highlights that corporate income taxation can be growth enhancing while
asset income taxation is growth retarding. Similarly, Peretto (2007), Abel (2007) and
Anagnostopoulos et al. (2012) show that the taxation of dividends and retained earnings
do not have the same effects on growth and that shifting the corporate tax burden from
the latter to the former can boost growth rates.
Optimal rates of capital taxation are also shown to be positive in various models
with heterogeneous agents. Aiyagari (1995), for example, demonstrates that this is the
case in the presence of incomplete insurance markets and borrowing constraints. Saez
(2013) and Golosov et al. (2013) provide a similar result in an environment of income
inequality due to unobserved heterogeneity across agents. In an overlapping genera-
tions model, Conesa et al. (2009) and Jacobs and Bovenberg (2009) show that positive
capital taxation is warranted as it allows the government to reduce distortionary labor
taxation which harms younger generations and hampers human capital accumulation.
Finally, Cozzi (2004), Gordon and Li (2009) and Acemoglu et al. (2011) provide
examples of how capital taxation can be growth enhancing by easing various political
constraints of the government.3
2 As the analysis of Straub and Werning (2014) highlights, though, this result hinges on the assumption
made about the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. With an elasticity of substitution below 1, which is
not empirically implausible, the optimal rate of capital taxation is no longer zero.
3 We should also point out that there is an extensive literature that investigates the implications of cap-
ital taxation in the case of open economies. See for example Gross (2014), Mayer-Foulkes (2015) and
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In parallel with the development of this extensive theoretical literature, a related
literature has emerged investigating empirically the relationship between capital tax-
ation and economic growth. An important challenge in these empirical studies is
measuring capital taxation, as pinning down this form of taxation is not as straight-
forward in practice as it is in theory. Most of the existing studies have focused on
the impact of corporate taxation, which constitutes one clear form of capital taxa-
tion. Following this approach, Lee and Gordon (2005) find that statutory corporate
tax rates are negatively correlated with growth rates across countries, whereas Arnold
et al. (2011) find the same result for the ratio of corporate to total taxation. Simi-
larly, Djankov et al. (2010) show that high effective corporate tax rates have also a
negative impact on investment, foreign direct investment, and entrepreneurial activ-
ity. These findings appear in line with the theoretical conclusions of Chamley and
Judd.
Employing broader measures of capital taxation, however, leads to less clear-cut
results. For example, in a cross-country panel, Mendoza et al. (1997) estimate the
impact on growth of effective tax rates on capital income stemming from dividends,
royalties, interest, rents and property and find that it is not statistically different from
zero. Easterly and Rebelo (1993) obtain similar results in the context of simple cross-
sectional regressions. More recent studies by Widmalm (2001), Angelopoulos et al.
(2007) and Arachi et al. (2015) investigating the impact of different capital tax instru-
ments on growth rates also find the relationship to be weak and non-robust.
A potential explanation for the absence of a consistent pattern in the data is that the
alleged effect of capital taxation may not be uniform across countries. This is suggested
by the fact that studies focused on OECD countries, such as those of Mendoza et al.
(1997), Widmalm (2001) and Arachi et al. (2015), do not find a clear negative effect
of capital taxation on growth rates. On the other hand, studies with a wider country
coverage, such as those of Lee and Gordon (2005) and Djankov et al. (2010), come
closer to finding the adverse effect of capital taxation suggested by theory. To this point,
however, the literature has not systematically investigated the potential heterogeneity
across countries in the effect of capital taxation. Work by Kneller et al. (1999) and
Gemmell et al. (2011) has demonstrated that capital taxation instruments that are more
distortionary tend to have a clear adverse effect on economic growth. Yet, their analysis
is only based on OECD countries and does not consider whether and why such effects
may vary with a country’s level of economic development.
3 Data and empirical strategy
3.1 Regression specification
To empirically assess the impact of capital taxation on economic growth, we follow an
approach that is now standard in the literature by estimating a growth regression in the
form of a dynamic panel that includes both country and year fixed effects (Eberhardt
Footnote 3 continued
McKeehan and Zodrow (2017) for recent contributions as well as Keen and Konrad (2013) for an overview
of this line of research.
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and Teal 2011). In this specification, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of
output per capita, ln yi,t , in country i in year t, which is regressed on its lagged value,
ln yi,t−1, and a set of other regressors. This set includes standard growth determinants
such as the rate of growth of the population, ni,t , the investment share, invi,t , the
growth rate of human capital, ghci,t , and the overall share of taxation in output, t ti,t . To
these we add a variable that measures capital taxation, tcapi,t , be it in the form of the
ratio of capital taxation to total taxation or in the form of an average or marginal rate.
In some specifications, we also employ additional regressors which we denote with
the vector Xi,t . Thus, our main regression equation is as follows:
ln yi,t = αi + αt + β1 ln yi,t−1 + β2ni,t + β3invi,t + β4ghci,t + β5t ti,t
+β6tcapi,t + γ ′Xi,t + εi,t . (1)
In our main analysis, we estimate Eq. (1) using a panel data set where each period
corresponds to 5 years. In this setup, ln yi,t−1 reflects the natural logarithm of output per
capita at the start of each 5-year period and ln yi,t is the value at the end of the period.
For all other regressors, the values correspond to an average over each respective 5-year
period. Taking average values is important as it avoids contamination of the estimates
by short-run fluctuations in the values of any of the regressors over the business cycle.
Given the dynamic-panel structure of the specification, the estimated coefficients β2
to β6 should be interpreted as reflecting the growth effects of the respective variables
over a 5-year period.
Our main coefficient of interest is β6. This coefficient reflects the impact of a change
in capital taxation, given the overall level of taxation in the economy, on the change
in output per capita relative to its initial value, that is, the growth rate of output per
capita. This corresponds to the impact on output growth of an increase in capital
taxation combined with an adjustment in other forms of taxes that keeps the total level
of taxation unchanged. Hence, the specification allows us to disentangle the effect
of capital taxation from that of overall taxation. If taxation is generally harmful for
growth, an increase in capital taxation not matched by a corresponding reduction in
some other tax would always be expected to be harmful for growth as well. By keeping
the total level of taxation fixed, the specific impact of an increase in the extent of capital
taxation can be assessed. A higher share of capital taxation in total taxation or a higher
average or marginal rate of capital taxation would thus imply that a country has shifted
the burden of taxation more toward capital relative to other forms of taxation.
3.2 Data
To estimate the above specification, we use tax data provided by the OECD. Specifi-
cally, from the OECD Revenue Statistics database we obtain information on total tax
revenue as well as the amounts of tax revenue coming from different forms of taxa-
tion. The data cover the years since 1965, although for several countries data are only
available for a subset of this time period. In total, we have tax data for 77 countries,
which include all current OECD members, as well as several Asian, African and Latin
American countries. We combine these tax data with national account information
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for these 77 countries provided by the Penn World Table, version 9.0 to construct an
unbalanced annual panel data set covering the years from 1965 to 2014. A list of the
countries included in our data set is provided in “Section A” of Appendix.
For our main analysis, we focus on three main measures for capital taxation which
have been used in the literature before and which can be constructed for most of the 77
countries in our sample. We start by looking at the ratio of corporate income taxation
to total taxation. We do so as corporate income taxation is a narrow but clear form
of capital taxation. We also construct a broader capital tax ratio that includes other
forms of capital taxation levied on property or investment goods. We further construct
a corresponding effective average rate of capital taxation following the approach of
Mendoza et al. (1994) as modified by Volkerink and de Haan (2001). Further details
and explicit formulas regarding the construction of these variables are provided in
“Section B” of Appendix.
In addition to these three measures, we also consider various alternative measures
of capital taxation. Specifically, in parts of our regression analysis we also employ top
or effective marginal rates of corporate income taxation as well as shares of corporate
taxation in aggregate GDP. However, as data on these measures are only available
for a considerably smaller subset of countries and years, we use them primarily for
robustness purposes.
Beyond measures of capital taxation, we also employ in our analysis similar mea-
sures of labor and consumption taxation. For these forms of taxation, we focus again
on three main measures, namely a narrow tax ratio, a broad tax ratio and an effective
average rate. These measures are also obtained from the information provided in the
OECD Revenue Statistics database following a similar approach as with the capital
taxation measures. The details here are also provided in “Section B” of Appendix.
Table 6 in “Section B” of Appendix reports key summary statistics for all these
variables. As we see in the table, looking at the correlations of our main capital taxation
measures with per capita GDP already suggests some important patterns in the data.
While there is a strong positive correlation between a country’s overall share of taxes
in GDP and its level of economic development, this is not the case for all measures of
taxation. Different measures of capital taxation are correlated differently with GDP
per capita, some positively and some not at all. This is in contrast to labor taxation
measures which tend to be positively related with GDP per capita and consumption
taxation measures which tend to be negatively related. Thus, what is evident from
the data at first glance is that as countries get richer they tend to tax their residents
more. They also do so more with direct forms of labor income taxation and less so with
indirect forms of consumption taxation, but not necessarily via capital income taxation.
4 Estimation results
4.1 Baseline results
Having discussed the nature of the data and our empirical strategy, we now turn
to the presentation of our estimation results. Table 1 displays the results from the
estimation of our main regression specification (1) by means of ordinary least squares.
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The first column of this table shows the estimation results for a specification that does
not include any capital taxation measure. The results suggest that our dynamic-panel
specification fits the data very well with a within R-squared that exceeds 0.9.
The estimated coefficients have the expected signs and are statistically significant
at conventional levels, with the exception of population growth. The coefficient on the
lagged value of output per capita is positive and less than one, signifying the presence
of conditional convergence (Islam 1995). The coefficient on the investment share is
positive suggesting a strong effect of investment spending on growth. This also holds
for the growth rate of human capital. Finally, the coefficient of the total taxation share is
negative underscoring primarily the adverse effect that tax distortions have on growth
rates (Kneller et al. 1999).4
Adding in column (2) the GDP share of corporate taxation instead of the GDP
share of total taxation we now observe an interesting pattern. While its inclusion
hardly affects the estimated coefficients of the other variables, the coefficient estimate
of the corporate tax share is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. This
implies that conditional on the values of the standard growth determinants, a shift
in the tax structure toward greater capital taxation is not harmful but beneficial for
economic growth.
In column (3) we include in the specification our first main measure of capital
taxation, the ratio of corporate taxation in total taxation, controlling this time for the
share of total taxation in GDP. This way we can better disentangle the effect of capital
taxation on growth from that of total taxation. As discussed in the previous section,
in this case the coefficient estimate on the corporate tax ratio reflects the effect of an
increase in corporate taxation that does not increase the total tax share. This would
correspond to an increase in corporate taxation that would be revenue neutral and which
would be achieved by a simultaneous reduction in other forms of taxation. Such an
increase would reflect a policy shift by the government toward a greater reliance on
corporate taxation as a source of revenue. Here we again observe a positive and highly
significant coefficient estimate.
In columns (4) and (5) of Table 1, we estimate the same specification using instead
our other two main measures of capital taxation, the broad tax ratio and the effective
tax rate. In both cases, we see a qualitatively similar pattern. The coefficient estimates
for these two capital measures are positive as well, although in column (4) the estimate
that we obtain is below conventional levels of statistical significance. Yet, in neither
case we see increases in capital taxation in the form of a higher tax ratio or a higher
effective rate to be strongly negatively associated with economic growth.
In the final two columns of the table, we estimate our main regression specification
employing as a measure of capital taxation first the top marginal rate and then the
effective marginal rate of corporate income taxation in each country. In both cases,
the estimation is based on a smaller sample of countries due to data availability. Nev-
ertheless, using also these variables, we do not see a negative association with growth
rates. In column (6) the coefficient estimate that we obtain is positive but statistically
insignificant. In column (7) the obtained coefficient is positive and statistically signif-
4 The pattern is similar if instead of the total tax revenue we control for the share of government spending
in aggregate GDP. This is not surprising, as the two variables are closely related and both reflect underlying
differences in the size of government across countries and over time.
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icant. Thus, in this case, the estimates confirm the pattern that we see with our three
main measures of capital taxation. Greater reliance on capital taxation does not appear
to be systematically linked with lower economic growth.
4.2 Heterogeneity across countries
The regression estimates presented thus far do not lend support to the conventional
wisdom that capital taxation is harmful for economic growth. In all of the specifications
of Table 1, we find the association between capital taxation and economic growth
to be strongly or weakly positive. In this section, we further explore whether this
effect is similar across more and less developed countries or whether there is some
heterogeneity across countries in this respect.
For this purpose, we construct a ”Low-Income” dummy variable to separate the
relatively less developed countries in our sample from the relatively more developed
ones. This dummy is then interacted with our different capital taxation measures to
allow for their effect to differ for less developed countries. To estimate the correct
income threshold below which the effect of capital taxation on growth should be
different, we first employ a threshold regression on the countries for which we have
data for the entire period from 1965 to 2014. Then we apply the estimated threshold
value of income to the whole of our sample. Beyond that, we also consider a continuous
interaction effect where the nature of the association between capital taxation and
growth is allowed to vary with a country’s relative income level. For this analysis, we
focus on the three main measures of capital taxation for which we have good data
coverage and for which we can estimate our main regression specification based on
roughly the same sample of countries.5 The estimation results from these regressions
are presented in Table 2.
Columns (1), (2) and (3) of Table 2 present the estimation results when the ratio of
corporate taxes to total taxation is used as our main measure of capital taxation. The first
column shows the estimates for the threshold regression, which necessitates the use of
a fully balanced panel throughout our sample period from 1965 to 2014. This leaves
us with a sample of 23 countries. Based on a goodness of fit criterion, the threshold
regression suggests a differential effect of capital taxation on growth for countries
whose per capita income levels are below a value of approximately 13,500 in terms
of constant 2005 dollars. This estimated differential effect is also highly statistically
significant. For the sub-sample of high-income countries the effect, captured by the
baseline capital taxation coefficient, is strongly positive as in Table 1. For the sub-
sample of low-income countries, on the other hand, the corresponding effect, obtained
by summing up the baseline and interaction term coefficients, is effectively negative.
In the second column of Table 2, we estimate the same interaction effect using
our full sample of countries including those for which the data for some years are
missing. For this estimation, we employ the same income cutoff point identified by
5 We should note here that these regressions can also be estimated using the top marginal and the effective
marginal corporate tax rates employed in the previous section and the obtained results are very similar. As
these data are only available for a smaller set of countries, however, we chose not to use these measures for
the remaining part of our analysis.
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the threshold regression in order to define our low-income dummy. As the estimation
results reveal, we find again the corporate taxation ratio to be positively associated with
growth rates for high-income countries. Yet, this is clearly not the case for low-income
countries. The estimated interaction effect with the low-income dummy is negative
and statistically significant. Moreover, in this case, the net effect for the low-income
countries is estimated to be not different from zero.
In the third column of Table 2, we go beyond a dichotomous split between high-
and low-income countries. As an alternative, we allow the effect of capital taxation to
change continuously as a country moves down along the world income distribution.
We do this by interacting the corporate tax ratio with an indicator of a country’s relative
position in the world income distribution. This indicator is defined as the income level
of the world’s richest country in any given year divided by a country’s own income
level in that same year. This variable ranges from 1 for the world income leader in each
year to around 45 for the poorest country in our sample. As the estimates reveal, we
again observe a significantly positive base effect of the corporate tax ratio on economic
growth for high-income countries. As the negative interaction effect shows, however,
the effect turns negative as we move down the income distribution.
To properly assess this effect, it is useful to look at the corresponding marginal
effect plot, which we show in panel (a) of Fig. 1. The graph shows the marginal effect
of the corporate tax ratio on real GDP growth for different values of relative income.
Moreover, the dotted lines indicate a 95% confidence interval and the histogram shows
the distribution of the relative income variable.6 From this graph it is clear that for
high-income countries, with relative income levels close to 1, the effect of corporate
taxation is estimated to be positive and statistically significant. Moving down the
income distribution the effect becomes smaller and eventually turns negative for low-
income countries.
Similar effects are observed for the other capital taxation measures. In columns
(4), (5), and (6) we look at the broad capital taxation ratio. Column (4) again starts
with the threshold regression for a balanced panel of countries. In this case again, as
indicated by the coefficient on the interaction term, there is a difference between the
effect of the capital tax ratio for high- and low-income countries which is significant
at the 5% level. This is despite the fact that the effect for the high-income countries is
positive but statistically insignificant. Thus, the net effect for low-income countries is
negative but close to zero. Moreover, we should note that the threshold identified here
is virtually identical to that in column (1).
When the same absolute threshold is again applied to a wider sample in column (5),
we observe the same pattern as in column (2). There is a highly statistically significant
difference in the effect between the two groups of countries, with a positive effect of
capital taxation on growth for the high-income countries and an almost zero effect
for the low-income ones. The obtained pattern is similar also when we use a relative
income interaction in column (6). This can again be illustrated with the marginal effect
6 From the histogram one may wonder whether the result that we document here is driven by a few outliers
that have very low income levels, since the density on the right part of the graph becomes very low. This
does not seem to be the case as the exact same result is obtained when these observations are dropped from
the sample.
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(a) Corporate Tax Ratio
(b) Broad Capital Tax Ratio




























Fig. 1 Marginal effect plots for relative income. Note The graphs show the marginal effect of different
measures of capital taxation on real GDP growth for different values of relative income. The dotted lines
indicate a 95% confidence interval and the histogram represents the distribution of relative income
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plot in panel (b) of Fig. 1. This plot is nearly identical to the one from panel (a) and,
hence, suggests the same conclusions.
Lastly in columns (7), (8), and (9) we repeat the same set of regressions employing
this time as the measure of capital taxation our constructed effective average capital
tax rates. Looking first at the threshold regression for the balanced panel in column
(7) we see a clear difference in the effect for high- and low-income countries. For
the high-income countries, the relationship between effective average capital tax rates
and growth rates is positive and statistically significant, while for low-income coun-
tries the estimated relationship is effectively zero. Applying to the full sample the
estimated absolute income threshold, which also in this case corresponds to approxi-
mately 13,500 in terms of constant 2005 dollars, we obtain the results of column (8).
The pattern that we obtain is the same, but more precisely estimated: a highly sig-
nificant positive effect in high-income countries and similarly a significant difference
with low-income countries. The same pattern is observed when employing the relative
income variable instead in column (9). Examining the marginal effect plot in panel
(c) of Fig. 1 is also reassuring. In countries where income levels are higher the effect
of capital taxation on growth appears to be positive, whereas in countries with lower
income levels the effect is negative.
Overall the results reported in this section suggest the presence of clear differences
across countries in how capital taxation affects economic growth. Exploring the nature
of this heterogeneity, we provide evidence that it is related to a country’s level of
development. In high-income countries that operate close to the technology frontier and
whose relative income levels are high, we find that greater reliance on capital taxation
relative to other forms of taxation tends not to be particularly harmful for growth. In
low-income countries, however, that operate further away from the technology frontier
and whose relative income levels are low, we find the effect of capital taxation to be
closer to being negative, as conventional wisdom suggests.
This pattern can also be shown to be robust to the inclusion of several additional
control variables which relate to other tax policy variables and to other factors influ-
encing the relationship between capital taxation and economic growth. This is shown
in greater detail in Table 7 in “Section C” of Appendix. Furthermore, the nature of the
relationship between capital taxation and economic growth can also be explored with
respect to other threshold variables. This analysis is presented in Table 8 in “Section C”
of Appendix. All together, these additional results corroborate the story presented so
far regarding the differential nature of the effect of capital taxation on growth between
developed and developing countries.
4.3 Correcting for endogeneity: GMM results
The regression results presented up to this point, although robust, may still be subject
to various types of biases. Particularly relevant in our empirical context is the dynamic-
panel bias due to the presence of a lagged dependent variable among the regressors
and the endogeneity bias caused by correlation of some of the regressors with the error
term. In the former case, the positive correlation between the lagged value of income
and the error term of the regression is likely to attenuate the coefficient estimates on the
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dependent variables and to make an otherwise negative coefficient on capital taxation
appear insignificant. In the latter case, the resulting endogeneity bias may shift the
estimated coefficients either upward or downward.
In order to avoid both types of bias, a common approach in the literature is to
use the GMM estimation techniques proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and
Blundell and Bond (1998). Both techniques rely on employing lagged values of the
potentially endogenous dependent variables as instruments. One crucial difference
between the two approaches relates to the exact choice of instruments. Arellano and
Bond, abbreviated as AB, suggest the use of lags of the endogenous regressors in
levels to estimate the specification of interest in first differences. On the other hand,
Blundell and Bond, abbreviated as BB, suggest the joint estimation of the specification
of interest in levels and in first differences using lags of the endogenous regressors in
terms of both levels and first differences.
In Table 3, we repeat for each of our three main capital taxation measures the
specification from Table 2 that includes the interaction with the low-income dummy
for the full sample of countries using both the AB and BB techniques. We focus
on the estimation of this specification which is relatively simpler. Columns (1) and
(2) present the estimation results first with the BB and then with the AB estimators
when using the corporate tax ratio. Columns (3) and (4) use the broad capital tax
ratio instead. Finally, the last two columns do the same using the effective aver-
age capital tax rate. In our implementation of both GMM estimation techniques,
we have followed the most conservative assumption of treating all included vari-
ables as potentially endogenous and instrumenting them. We also restrict the number
of instruments, as suggested by Roodman (2009), to avoid potential instrument
overfitting.
What is immediately clear from the table is that a meaningful correction for the
dynamic panel and endogeneity bias does not alter the qualitative nature of our main
results. Comparing the estimates in this table to those in columns (2), (5), and (8) of
Table 2, it is clear that they are very similar. In all cases, we observe a highly significant
difference between low- and high-income countries in terms of the coefficient estimate
for all three of the capital taxation measures. The effect for high-income countries
is also estimated to be positive in all cases and, with the exception of column (6),
highly statistically significant. These coefficients, thus, imply that the net effects for
the lower income countries appear to be approximately zero in all cases. Overall the
results of Table 3 suggest that the potential endogeneity biases are not the reason for
the observed differential effect of capital taxation on economic growth between high-
and low-income countries.
For all regressions in Table 3, we also report the results of two key specification tests,
the Hansen J -test for instrument exogeneity and the Arellano–Bond test for second-
order autocorrelation. A significant Hansen J -statistic would indicate that some of
the instruments are likely not exogenous. Similarly, a significant test statistic for the
Arellano–Bond autocorrelation test would indicate that some of our instruments are
potentially correlated with the error term. As indicated by the reported p-values, the
J -test statistic is in all cases insignificant. For the autocorrelation test statistic for the
BB estimates the p-values fall in between the 5% and the 10% level. Given that this
does not seem to be the case for the AB estimates, it seems that the issue lies with
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774 F. ten Kate, P. Milionis
the use of the lagged first differences as instruments which are employed in the BB
estimation but not for the AB estimation.
4.4 Results with annual data
The consistency of the results obtained thus far should increase our confidence in the
conclusion that at least in developed countries capital taxation does not appear harmful
for economic growth and that this is less the case among developing countries. Yet, in
our estimation approach to this point we have not fully utilized the annual frequency of
the observations in our data set. Given the nature of our data, an alternative approach is
to estimate the effect of capital taxation on growth rates using the panel error-correction
estimation techniques developed by Pesaran et al. (1999).
Following Pesaran et al. (1999), we can separately estimate the short-run response
of the dependent variable to changes in the independent one from the long-run rela-
tionship between these variables. In the context of our empirical setup, this implies
the estimation of the extended specification given below:
 ln yi,t = −φi
(
ln yi,t − β2ni,t − β3invi,t − β4ghci,t − β5t ti,t − β6tcapi,t
−β7tcapi,t · dlowi − γ ′Xi,t − αi − αt
) + δ1,ini,t + δ2,iinvi,t
+ δ3,ighci,t + δ4,it ti,t + δ5,itcapi,t + δ6,itcapi,t · dlowi + εi,t . (2)
In this equation, the βs coefficients capture the long-run effects on each respective
regressor on GDP per capita growth, while the δs,i coefficients capture the correspond-
ing short-run effects of the same regressors. Of particular interest in this specification
is the adjustment coefficient φ that reflects the speeds at which GDP per capita con-
verges to its long-run equilibrium value.7 To capture time-invariant country-specific
characteristics as well as global trends affecting growth rates, we further include in the
specification a set of country and year dummies. Finally, the specification incorporates
the low-income dummy dlowi , which is interacted with t
cap
i,t in order to estimate the
differential effect of capital taxation on growth for high- and low-income countries.
One important choice when estimating this specification is what restrictions to
impose on the long-run and the short-run coefficients of Eq. (2). One approach is to
impose homogeneity on both sets of coefficients across countries. This would result
in the standard dynamic-panel fixed-effects estimator (DFE). An alternative approach
would be to allow the short-run coefficients to vary across countries, while maintaining
the homogeneity assumption regarding the long-run coefficients. This leads to the
pooled mean group panel estimator (PMG), preferred by Pesaran et al. (1999). This
approach is based on the assumption that the countries in the sample follow a similar
development path in the long run, but their growth trajectories could differ in the short
run.
Below we present the estimation results when employing these two estimators based
on annual frequency data. For comparison, we also report the corresponding estimates
7 Note that in this case we do not have to employ 5-year averages of the variables. The separation between
long-run and short-run coefficients allows us to still account for the effect of the business cycle.
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obtained when using a simple OLS regression with country and year fixed effects,
which does not separate the short- and long-run effects. As in Tables 2 and 3, we
perform this estimation using our three main capital taxation measures. In particular
in columns (1), (2) and (3) we use the corporate tax ratio as the measure of capital
taxation, in columns (4), (5) and (6) we use the broad capital tax ratio, and in columns
(7), (8) and (9) the effective average capital tax rate. In all cases panel Table 4 reports
the OLS and long-run estimates, while the short-run estimates for the PMG and DFE
estimators are reported in Table 5.8
Starting with the OLS estimates in columns (1), (4), and (7) of Table 4, we see
that using annual data yields very similar results to those obtained previously using 5-
year averages. In all cases, the capital taxation measure has a positive and statistically
significant association with output growth in high-income countries. Furthermore,
there is a statistically significant difference with its effect in low-income countries.
The estimated magnitudes of the effects are smaller in this case, but this is because
of the higher frequency of the data.9 The within R-squared reported in the table is
substantially lower than the values we obtained before, which is the result of employing
annual data rather than averages and of having the growth rate as the dependent variable
instead of the level of GDP per capita.
Proceeding to the DFE estimates in columns (2), (5), and (8), we can now compare
the long- and short-run coefficient estimates in Tables 4 and 5. The pattern that emerges
is again similar. For high-income countries, we see a positive association between all
three measures of capital taxation and growth, both in the long run and in the short run.
Regarding the interaction effect, however, we see that while the short-run coefficients
are significant for all three variables, the long-run coefficients are only significant
for one of the three, namely the broad capital tax ratio. Thus, according to the DFE
estimator, which constrains the short- and long-run coefficients to be the same for all
countries, the differential effect of capital taxation on growth appears to be mostly of
a short-run nature.
Turning to the PMG estimates, however, which relax this homogeneity assumption
with respect to the short-run coefficients, suggests a different conclusion. Comparing
the estimates reported in columns (3), (6), and (9) of Tables 4 and 5, we see again
for high-income countries a positive association between all three measures of capital
taxation and growth rates, both in the long run and in the short run. In the case of the
interaction effect, however, we see this time that for all three variables the short-run
coefficients are statistically insignificant, while the long-run coefficients are negative
and significant. This suggests that the assumption of homogeneity of the short-run
coefficients imposed by the DFE estimator may have been too restrictive and the
8 We should note here that the sample of countries used for this estimation is slightly smaller. Countries
with fewer than 15 years of data have been omitted from the analysis in this table to ensure convergence of
the PMG estimator. For consistency, we do not include these countries also in the sample for the OLS and
DFE estimation. Doing otherwise, though, does not affect the results.
9 In fact we should note here that all coefficients are roughly of a factor five smaller than before, as expected
given that we are using annual data instead of 5-year averages. Additionally the coefficient on the log of
lagged output is one point lower than before because the dependent variable is now the change in the log
of output rather than its level.
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778 F. ten Kate, P. Milionis
correct conclusion is that the differential effect of capital taxation on growth is more
of a long-run nature.
In addition to the differences in the estimates for the capital taxation measures
and their interactions with the low-income dummy, there are a number of additional
differences between the DFE and PMG estimators in the obtained estimates for the
other regressors, which suggest that the PMG estimator is a better choice. Overall with
the PMG estimator the statistical significance of the long-run coefficients for our other
regressors is higher than with the DFE estimator. Instead with the DFE estimator we
tend to find statistically significant short-run coefficients for many of the variables,
while with the PMG estimator this is only the case for the investment share. The
DFE estimator, however, assumes no difference in the short-run coefficients across
countries. If the assumption is inaccurate, though, the obtained estimates would be
inconsistent and the importance of short-run dynamics will be overstated.
On the other hand, the PMG estimator, which allows the short-run coefficients
to vary across countries, is more conservative in this respect. This should be the
case, if countries’ short-run growth trajectories vary due to differences in business
cycle dynamics. This possibility is supported by the results of a simple Hausman
test which indicates that the restriction of homogeneity in long-run coefficients is
quite reasonable, yet less so in short-run coefficients.10 Overall, these patterns and the
comparison with our analysis based on averages from the previous section indicate
that the PMG estimates provide a more consistent picture for the effect of capital
taxation on growth.11 This effect is primarily a long-run effect which consistently
varies between high- and low-income countries.
5 Model description
Having documented the differential nature of the relationship between capital taxation
and economic growth across high- and low-income countries, we now proceed to
rationalize it in the context of a model of endogenous growth. This rationalization is
important as none of the existing theoretical contributions in the literature can justify
why capital taxation is more detrimental for growth in developing than in developed
countries, as our empirical results suggest. While several of the papers, discussed in
Sect. 2, indicate that under some circumstances rates of capital taxation should be
positive, these circumstances appear more relevant for developing than for developed
countries.12
10 We should note here that the PMG estimator is consistent regardless of whether the restriction of
homogeneity in the short-run coefficients is accurate, whereas the DFE estimator is efficient when the
restriction is true, but inconsistent when it is not. Both approaches can be contrasted against the mean group
estimator, which allows for heterogeneity in both short- and long-run coefficients.
11 This conclusion is also supported by the estimates for the adjustment coefficient, φ, which are negative
and statistically significant in the case of PMG estimates suggesting the existence of a common co-integrating
vector.
12 For example, if positive capital taxation is justified by inequality considerations (Saez 2013), market
incompleteness (Aiyagari 1995), lack of fiscal capacity (Gordon and Li 2009) or short-sightedness of
politicians (Acemoglu et al. 2011), then optimal rates of capital taxation should be higher in developing
countries where these phenomena are more prevalent. If this is the case, then the same observed positive
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To account for why capital taxation is more detrimental for growth in developing
countries, we propose a model where the rate of economic growth is endogenous and
explicitly linked with capital taxation. Our model is a variant of a multi-country version
of the Schumpeterian growth model of Aghion and Howitt (1992) where the long-run
engine of growth is the introduction of technologically improved intermediate inputs.
These improvements are either products of domestic innovation or the results of imi-
tation of existing intermediate inputs from more technologically advanced countries.
Thus, the model allows for technology transfer and this is the only source of interaction
across countries.
While this multi-country version of the Aghion–Howitt model has been used many
times before to analyze the process of technology transfer and income convergence
across countries (Acemoglu et al. 2006; Aghion et al. 2005), the implications of the
model for capital taxation have never been studied before. For this purpose, we modify
the model to allow for capital accumulation and capital taxation. Using this modified
structure, we can study the effects of capital taxation on the long-run equilibrium level
and the growth rate of output for different economies which vary in their proximity
to the technology frontier. To keep the exposition of the model simple, we do not
introduce an explicit country index. We only have a time index, t, which evolves
discretely.
5.1 Production structure
The production side of the economy consists of three sectors: a final-good, an interme-
diate good and a research sector. The unique final good is produced by a large number
of competitive firms based on the Cobb–Douglas production technology
Yt = (Lt )1−α
∫ 1
0
[At (s)]1−α[xt (s)]αds, (3)
that combines labor Lt together with a continuum of different intermediate good
variants x indexed by s, with At (s) being a productivity parameter that reflects the
quality of the current vintage of each intermediate good variant. Final good producers
employ labor and intermediate goods to maximize their profits based on the inverse
demand functions
wt = (1 − α)(Lt )−α
∫ 1
0
[At (s)]1−α[xt (s)]αds, (4)
pt (s) = α[At (s)Lt ]1−α[xt (s)]α−1, (5)
where wt corresponds to the real wage in the final-good sector and pt (s) to the price
of the intermediate good s relative to that of the final good.
Footnote 12 continued
rate of capital taxation will correspond to a large deviation from the optimal rate in developed economies.
Hence, it should be more detrimental for growth in developed rather than developing countries.
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The productivity of each intermediate good variant depends on its vintage, with
newer vintages having higher productivity levels. Each vintage is the result of an
intensive research and development process (R&D) undertaken by competitive firms
employing resources in the form of the final good. Each firm entering the research
sector aims at producing a new vintage of a given intermediate good variant which
would allow the firm to temporarily monopolize the production of that intermediate
good. This production process is characterized by uncertainty, with μt (s) denoting the
probability of a successful innovation of a new vintage of intermediate good variant s in
period t . If this process is successful, it leads to an increase in the productivity level of
variant s above the economy-wide average productivity At−1 by a fixed factor η > 1.




ηAt−1 w.p. μt (s)
At−1(s) w.p. 1 − μt (s)
}
. (6)











with Dt (s) corresponding to the amount of the final good employed in period t in
the research and development process for intermediate good s, which is adjusted
by the targeted productivity level. In addition to this firm-specific component, the




 > 0 and 0 < ϕ < 1, that is a function of aggregate productivity-
adjusted government spending, Gt . This way our model incorporates the positive link
between government spending and growth emphasized by Jones et al. (1993).
New intermediate-good vintages can also be introduced from abroad as imitations
of those already existing in other countries. Specifically, following Howitt (2000), we
postulate that there is a world technological frontier that expands exogenously at a
rate γ > 013:
A¯t = A¯t−1(1 + γ ). (8)
Imitators from any given country can introduce older vintages of intermediate goods of
any variant from the frontier without undertaking any R&D and raise the productivity
of the intermediate good s to:
At (s) = θ A¯t−1, 0 < θ < 1.
This implies that imitation of existing vintages from the frontier is preferred to the
invention of new ones in any country whose productivity ratio to the technology frontier
13 When considering the evolution of the world technology frontier, we should in principle consider the
extent to which the frontier grows as a result of domestically produced innovations. To keep the analysis
simple, we ignore this link by focusing our analysis on a small-size economy and refer the reader to Aghion
et al. (2005) for more on this point.
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All intermediate-good variants are produced with physical capital as the sole input
in the production process. Specifically, we assume a simple linear one-for-one tech-
nology: xt (s) = Kt (s). The production of intermediate goods may take place under
perfect or imperfect competition, depending on whether for each variant a new vintage
has been invented or not.
In case of intermediate good variants for which a new vintage has been invented, the
innovating firm of the latest vintage functions as the incumbent monopolist producer
for that variant. Given the demand for each intermediate input from the final-good
sector, the profit-maximizing price of the incumbent monopolist is pt = 1α rt , where
rt is the real interest rate paid to capital stock holders.14 Yet, following Aghion et al.
(2005) and Acemoglu et al. (2006) we assume that the incumbent monopolist is con-
strained by a competitive fringe of imitators who can produce an alternative version
of the latest vintage of the intermediate good at a higher marginal cost of η units of
capital.15 This implies that the competitive price of these alternative versions would
be pt = ηrt . Letting η < 1α we have a situation where the monopolist is not able to
charge the profit maximizing price of 1
α
as the final-good producers would then opt
for the imitators’ product. Instead, the incumbent is forced to charge the competitive
price, which keeps the imitators out of the market and still allows for some positive
profits.
These monopoly profits, however, only last for one period. In the subsequent period,
the incumbent monopolist retires and the production is taken over either by a new
incumbent that has succeeded in inventing a new improved vintage of the interme-
diate good or by the competitive fringe of imitators. In either case, the above set of
assumptions guarantees that all intermediate good variants are priced at pt = ηrt
independently of how the market for each variant is structured. The demand for each
variant equals xt (s) = ( αrtη )
1
1−α At (s)Lt and the corresponding profits for incumbent
monopolists are:
πt (s) = (η − 1)rt xt (s). (10)
These profits are what research and development firms seek to reap, and thus,
provide an incentive for technological innovation. However, assuming as in Klasing
and Milionis (2014) that entry into the research-sector is free and that potential entrants
are all risk neutral implies that research and development firms will earn zero expected
net profits. Hence, the allocation of resources in the research sector will be governed
by the following research arbitrage condition,
14 This last equation can be obtained from the first-order condition of the monopolist’s profit maximization
problem, max{xt (i),Kt (i)}{pt (i)xt (i) − rt Kt (i)}, after the inverse demand for xt (i), Eq. (5) has been
substituted in. Because the optimal price is the same across all variants we drop the reference to i .
15 This implies that the advantage of an innovating firm in terms of production cost over the competi-
tive fringe is of the same magnitude as the size of the technological improvement embedded in the new
intermediate-good vintage. This assumption can be justified if the fringe has access to the technology of
the previous vintage of that intermediate good. This would naturally occur if that technology was patent-
protected and the patent expired following the arrival of the new vintage.
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Dt (s) = μt (s)πt (s). (11)
Substituting (7) and (10) into (11), it can be shown that in equilibrium the innovation
process is ex ante symmetrical across intermediate good variants and the corresponding
















t Lt . (12)
Noting for the total capital stock in the economy that Kt =
∫ 1
0 Kt (s)ds and for the
average productivity parameter that At =
∫ 1
0 At (s)ds, following Howitt and Aghion
(1998) we can rewrite the final good production function (3) more compactly as:
Yt = K αt (At Lt )1−α, (13)
or in per efficiency units terms as yt = kαt , where kt ≡ KtAt Lt corresponds to the
capital per efficiency unit of labor employed in the final goods sector. This allows for
the wage, the real interest rate and the aggregate expected intermediate-good sector
profits to be written simply as:









Let the economy be populated by a constant mass of infinitely-lived identical house-
holds. The representative household decides on an optimal time path of consumption,









where β is the time-discount factor, ω captures the relative disutility of labor compared
to the utility of consumption and ψ is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
Households own both the stock of physical capital and the firms. Thus, their income
comes from three sources, labor income, capital rental rates and firm profits. Their
budget constraint can hence be written as:
Ct +[Kt+1 − (1−δ)Kt ] = (1−τ kt )rt Kt + (1−τ lt )wt Lt + (1−τπt )(t − Dt ). (16)
The left-hand side of the equation denotes household expenditures on consumption and
investment with δ corresponding to the capital depreciation rate. The right-hand side
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shows the households’ after tax income given the tax rates imposed by the government
on labor income, τ lt , capital income, τ kt , and firm profits net of R&D costs, τπt .
The maximization problem yields two optimality conditions. The intertemporal
consumption Euler equation given by,
Ct+1 = β[1 + (1 − τ kt+1)rt+1 − δ]Ct , (17)
and the intratemporal arbitrage equation between consumption and labor supply,
ω(Lt )ψCt = (1 − τ lt )wt . (18)
5.3 Government
The government in each economy is modeled following Chamley (1986) and Judd
(1985). It has a stream of spending {Gt }∞t=0 that it aims to finance. For simplicity, we
assume this spending to grow at exactly the same rate as the economy, Gt = At G0, so
that it corresponds to a fixed share of the economy’s output in every period. To raise
revenue it relies on the three tax instruments already discussed in the previous section:
a tax on capital income at rate τ kt , a tax on labor income at rate τ lt , and a tax on firm
net profits at rate τπt .16,17 This implies the following government budget constraint:
Gt = τ kt rt Kt + τ lt wt Lt + τπt (t − Dt ). (19)
5.4 Aggregate productivity and growth
Our model features an endogenous long-run growth rate which is driven by quality
improvements in intermediate goods raising aggregate productivity. Capital accumu-
lation plays only a reinforcing role to this endogenous innovation process, as in Howitt
and Aghion (1998), but would eventually come to a halt in the absence of increases
in aggregate productivity. These quality improvements in a given economy can in
principle come from two sources: innovation of new intermediate good variants and
imitation of existing variants from the technology frontier. As explained above, these
sources do not operate complementarily but act as substitutes to one another.
As Eq. (9) indicates, innovation will only take place in an economy where the current
level of productivity relative to the technology frontier lies above the fixed threshold θ
η
.
In that case, aggregate productivity will follow the law of motion At+1 = [1+μt (η−
1)]At and its growth rate, gt , will be proportional to the rate of innovation μt . However,
if the productivity ratio relative to the frontier, at , is below the θη threshold, then
productivity growth will be driven by imitation. In that case, aggregate productivity
will follow the law of motion At+1 = θ A¯t and its growth rate can be shown to be
16 As implied by our research arbitrage equation (11), net profits are zero in all periods. Thus, the
government-imposed rate of profit taxation plays no role in our analysis.
17 It is important also to note here that the model counterpart of the corporate profit taxation on which
we focus in our empirical analysis is the revenue from both capital income and net profits. This is because
profits in the model are net of payments to all factors of production.
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inversely proportional to at . Thus, we can summarize the productivity dynamics of


















Having described all the elements of our model economy, we can now proceed to
define and analyze its equilibrium. The dynamic equilibrium of the model will con-
sist of a sequence, starting from period t = 0, of the main endogenous variables
{At , Kt , Yt , Ct , Lt , Dt ,t , rt , wt , μt , at }∞t=0 for each country given the initial con-
ditions {A0, K0, G0, a0} and a path of fiscal variables {τ kt , τ lt , τπt }∞t=0. The sequence
should be such that for the resulting prices all households maximize their utility, all
firms maximize their profits, the government obeys its budget constraint, and factor
markets clear. Furthermore the resource constraint of the economy has to be satisfied
so that:
Yt + (1 − δ)Kt = Ct + Kt+1 + Dt + Gt . (21)
For the purpose of our analysis, we focus on a stationary equilibrium of the model
where variables {At , Kt , Yt , Ct , Dt ,t , wt } grow at a balanced rate and variables
{Lt , rt , μt , at } are constant. In our characterization of the equilibrium, we also treat
the tax rates as fixed, {τ k, τ l , τπ }, so that we can then analyze their comparative static
effects on the equilibrium level and growth rate of output. To determine the equilibrium
values of all endogenous variables, we follow the approach of Aghion et al. (2013).
The details are provided in “Section D” of Appendix. In essence we use equations
(13), (17), (18), (19) and (21) substituting out the remaining endogenous variables,
to solve for the stationary values of the key endogenous variables Kt , Yt , Ct , in per
effective worker terms as well as Lt . We then use Eq. (20) to determine the equilibrium
growth rate. Based on this approach we can prove the following lemma.
Lemma 1 If δ = 1 and the economy is in a stationary equilibrium with Lt constant
at L∗ and Kt , Yt , Ct growing at rate g∗, then it must be that L∗ = { (1−α)(1−τ l )ωρ }
1
1+ψ ,




1−α , yt ≡ YtAt Lt is fixed at y∗ = (k∗)α and
ct ≡ CtAt Lt is fixed at c∗ = ρy∗ with ρ = 1− αη (η− 1+β)− αη (1−β)τ k − (1−α)τ l .
Proof See Appendix. unionsq
6.1 Level and growth effects of tax rates
Having characterized the stationary equilibrium of the model economy, we can now
study the level effects and the growth effects resulting from changes in the fixed tax
rates on capital, τ k, and labor, τ l . In the context of this analysis, we do not consider
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changes in the tax rate on firm net profits, τπ , since these profits are always zero in
equilibrium, as we already remarked above.
6.1.1 Case I: Lagging economy
We perform this comparative static analysis first for the case of an economy that is far
from the technology frontier and where growth is driven by imitation. To determine the
equilibrium growth rate of the economy and the corresponding values of all endoge-
nous variables, we first need to pin down the equilibrium value for at . Dividing the law
of motion for aggregate productivity At+1 = θ A¯t by A¯t+1 and noting (8) we get that:
a∗ = θ
(1 + γ ) .
Substituting this expression into (20) we obtain the long-run growth rate g∗ = γ.
Hence, in this case the long-run growth rate will be exogenous to the economy’s char-
acteristics and equal to that of the technology frontier. This equilibrium will emerge
provided that η < 1 + γ, so that a∗ < θ
η
, as postulated initially. For this equilibrium,
we can show the following comparative static effects.
Proposition 1 Consider an economy where η < 1 + γ and δ = 1. In this economy,
an increase in the rate of capital taxation, τ k, will lead to an increase in equilibrium
labor supply, L∗, and a decrease in the long-run level of capital per effective worker,
k∗. An increase in the rate of labor taxation, τ l , on the other hand, will reduce L∗, but
have no effect on k∗. Increases in either τ k and τ l do not affect the long-run growth
rate of the economy, g∗.
Proof The proof of the proposition follows from comparative static analysis of the
equilibrium values of L∗ and k∗ derived in Lemma 1 and uses the fact that g∗ = γ. unionsq
As the proposition makes clear, in an economy that is far from the technology
frontier increases in tax rates have negative-level effects on economic activity, but
they do not influence the economy’s long-run growth rate.
6.1.2 Case II: Leading economy
Let us now turn to the case of an economy that is close to the technology frontier and
where growth is driven by domestic innovation. In this case, expression (20) implies




equilibrium will emerge provided that η ≥ 1 + γ, and in this case is independent of
the exact value of at . For this equilibrium, we can show the following comparative
static effects.
Proposition 2 Consider an economy where η ≥ 1 + γ and δ = 1. In this economy,
an increase in the rate of capital taxation, τ k, will lead to an increase in equilibrium
labor supply, L∗, and a decrease in the long-run level of capital per effective worker,
k∗. An increase in the rate of labor taxation, τ l , will have the opposite effect reducing
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L∗ and increasing k∗. Increases in τ k and τ l reduce the long-run growth rate of the
economy, g∗.
Proof The proof of the proposition again follows from a comparative static analy-
sis. The effects on L∗ can be obtained from the equilibrium value of L∗ derived






1−α after substituting in g∗ = α (η−1)2
η

(G0)ϕ(k∗)α L∗ and not-
ing the equilibrium value of L∗. To obtain the effects on g∗ one needs to implicitly
differentiate g∗ = α (η−1)2
η






and noting the equilibrium value of L∗. unionsq
As the proposition makes clear, in an economy that is close to the technology
frontier increases in tax rates not only have negative level effects on economic activity,
but they also reduce the economy’s long-run growth rate. This is because higher
taxes on capital will lower the capital intensity of the economy and higher taxes on
labor will lower employment. Both these changes will result in lower profits from the
introduction of new intermediate goods. These profits, however, are what stimulates
potential innovators in the R&D sector, and they determine the market size for new
innovations. As profits go down, there will be fewer innovations each period and,
hence, lower growth.
6.2 Growth promoting effects of nonzero capital taxation
Having documented the level effects and the growth effects resulting from isolated
changes in the fixed rates of capital and labor incomes taxes, we now proceed to
explore how combined fiscal policy changes can affect the long-run growth rate of
the economy. In this exploration, we ignore the case of an economy that is far from
the technology frontier where the long-run growth rate is effectively exogenous and
focus on the case of an economy that is close to the technology frontier and for which
changes in the fiscal variables can influence the long-run growth rate, as established
in Proposition 2.
Following a similar approach as in Peretto (2003, 2007), we consider two combined
fiscal policy changes. The first one is an increase in the capital tax rate, τ k, coupled
with a corresponding decrease in the labor tax rate, τ l , that leaves total tax revenue
and, hence, government spending, G0, unchanged. The second one is an increase in τ k
coupled with a corresponding increase in G0 that leaves τ l unchanged. To compare the
impact of these policy changes on growth relative to the standard policy prescription of
zero capital taxation, we will analyze these policy changes starting from an equilibrium
where τ k is initially zero and all the revenue that the government needs in order to
finance its spending is raised from taxes on labor only.
To facilitate the analysis in the absence of a closed-form solution for k∗ and g∗, we
follow Aghion et al. (2013) and compute an approximate value of the long-run growth
rate for values of η ≈ 1. The value of 1 for η serves as a good benchmark, since it
corresponds to the case where intermediate good producers cannot make any profits
and, hence, do not devote any resources to innovation. In the resulting benchmark
equilibrium, long-run growth is driven by imitation and is equal to the growth rate of
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the technology frontier, γ . Moreover, when an economy is in that equilibrium changes
in the capital tax rate will have no effect on the long-run growth rate.
In this subsection, we explore the extent to which increases in capital taxation above
zero will affect the long-run growth rate of a stationary equilibrium in the vicinity of
this benchmark equilibrium. While limiting our focus only to cases where η ≈ 1 may
appear as quite restrictive, we should emphasize that it is not. By construction values
of η less than 1 are not admissible and, as explained in the previous section, η needs
to be greater than 1 + γ in order for innovation to preferable to imitation. At the same
time, values for η substantially larger than 1 are not empirically plausible either. This
is because they would imply big jumps in productivity from individual innovations
and would also result in large shares of output being devoted to R&D, as evident from
(14 ). With this in mind, we establish the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Consider an economy where η ≥ 1 + γ and δ = 1. For values of η ≈ 1 the
long-run growth rate of the economy is equal to:
g¯(η) = (η − 1)2α
(G0)ϕ
[




(1 − α)(1 − τ l)
ω[1 − αβ − α(1 − β)τ k − (1 − α)τ l ]
] 11+ψ
(22)
Proof See Appendix. unionsq
Using this approximate expression for the long-run growth rate, the proposition
below establishes that small increases in capital taxation starting from a benchmark
equilibrium where the tax rate on capital is zero can, under some conditions, lead to
an increase in the long-run growth rate.
Proposition 3 Consider an economy where η ≥ 1 + γ but η ≈ 1,and δ = 1. Suppose
the economy is in a stationary equilibrium with τ k = 0. An increase in τ k coupled with
a decrease in τ l that leaves the government budget in balance increases the long-run
growth rate of the economy provided that τ l is high enough. Similarly, an increase
in τ k coupled with an increase in G0 that leaves the government budget in balance
increases the long-run growth rate of the economy provided that τ l is low enough.
Proof See Appendix. unionsq
The main intuition for both results is similar. Around the benchmark equilibrium
of η = 1 the distortions resulting from an increase in capital taxation are limited. If
at the same time labor taxation is high, which can have a large adverse effect on labor
supply and innovation rates, then a marginal shift of the taxation burden toward capital
can boost growth rates. Furthermore, if government spending has a positive impact on
innovation rates, a marginal increase in capital taxation used to fund additional govern-
ment spending can also be growth enhancing in an economy where tax rates are low.
As Proposition 3 makes clear, though, these growth-enhancing effects of capital
taxation only apply to economies that are close to the technology frontier. These
economies are actively involved in technological innovation for which the domestic
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market size plays an important role. These effects do not apply to economies that
are further away from the technology frontier. For such economies, growth will be
exogenous and it will simply be driven by imitation of existing technologies from the
frontier. Thus, changes in tax policies should not be expected to influence the rate of
long-run growth.
7 Conclusion
One of the main policy prescriptions in the public finance literature is that the optimal
tax rate on capital income should be zero. This is because any positive rate of capital
taxation is bound to distort the intertemporal allocation of resources in an economy
between the present and the future, and thus adversely affects economic growth. In
this paper, we start by investigating empirically whether capital taxation is indeed
retarding growth in a large panel of 77 developed and developing countries going
back to 1965 using different ways of measuring capital taxation. We conduct our
empirical analysis using a variety of econometric methods that include the standard
panel growth regressions with fixed effects, the GMM estimation techniques proposed
by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998), and the panel error-
correction estimation techniques of Pesaran et al. (1999).
In contrast to this stark prescription stemming from theory, in our empirical analysis
we do not find that greater reliance on capital taxation has a strong negative effect on
economic growth. Measuring reliance on capital taxation in different ways, we actually
obtain for several capital taxation measures a positive and statistically significant
relationship with a country’s rate of economic growth. Moreover, we demonstrate
that the nature of the relationship between growth and capital taxation varies with a
country’s level of development with the association being strongly positive for high-
income countries but weaker and typically insignificant for low-income countries.
This pattern is also robust across econometric specifications and when using different
measures of capital taxation.
To rationalize our empirical findings, we propose a multi-country innovation-based
growth model where innovations spill over from leading to lagging economies. Our
model highlights two channels through which capital taxation can have a positive
impact on long-run growth rates: (a) by reducing distortionary labor taxation, and (b) by
funding productive government spending. As the analysis of our model demonstrates,
these channels apply only to leading economies that are close to the technology frontier
and where growth is driven by domestic innovation. For lagging economies that are
far from the technology frontier, these channels are not relevant, as growth is driven
by imitation of foreign innovations and is effectively exogenous.
Our finding regarding the differential effect of capital taxation on growth rates for
leading and lagging economies also suggests that optimal rates of capital and labor
taxation may differ between these groups of economies. This could be explored further
following the approach of Aghion et al. (2013). Their analysis together with ours
implies that the standard theoretical prescription of zero capital taxation seems less
relevant for developed economies where domestic innovation is an important engine
of growth and fiscal policies can play an important role in boosting that engine. In
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these economies, it can be beneficial in terms of economic growth to shift part of the
burden of taxation to capital. This will occur either when the resulting tax revenue is
used to finance government spending that supports innovation or when it is combined
with a lowering of the tax burden on labor, which is also an important input in the
innovation process.
This conclusion, however, is not equally applicable to less developed economies
where the main engine of growth is the imitation of existing technologies. As this
process cannot be stimulated by capital taxes, the optimality of zero capital taxation
is likely to still apply in these economies. Moreover, low capital taxation might even
be a useful way to attract investment by foreign corporations and knowledge transfers
from the technology frontier. In our model, these complexities have not been explicitly
modeled, as technology transfer is assumed to occur without any costs or frictions.
In reality, though, this process may require large capital investments and be subject
to fierce competition (International Monetary Fund 2014).18 Thus, for less-developed
economies maintaining an attractive tax structure for foreign investors with low rates
of capital taxation is of higher priority compared to developed economies.
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Appendix
Section A: List of countries in our sample
Our sample consists of the following 77 countries:
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bolivia,
Brazil, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic,
Cote d’ Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala,
Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kaza-
khstan, Kenya, Korea, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru,
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Rwanda, Senegal, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slove-
nia, South Africa, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago,
Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela.
18 See Acemoglu et al. (2006) for an example of how such frictions could be introduced in an innovation-
based growth framework.
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Section B: Data description and sources
This section provides details on all the variables that we employ in our empirical
analysis. It explains how each variable is constructed and on which sources it is based.
Table 6 provides the key descriptive statistics for each variable.
GDP per capita figures for all countries are taken from the Penn World Table,
Version 9.0 (Feenstra et al. 2015). Specifically, given our focus on growth rates, we
employ the real GDP series in constant 2011 national prices (rgdpna), which we divide
with the population figures from the same database to obtain the per capita values.
The population growth rate corresponds to the inter-annual rate of change in the
total population of each country and is also calculated based on the population data
reported in the Penn World Table, Version 9.0.
The investment share corresponds to the ratio of gross fixed capital formation to
GDP in current prices reported in the Penn World Table, Version 9.0.
Our human capital growth measure is the growth rate of human capital index
provided by the Penn World Table, Version 9.0. The index reflects the stock of human
capital in each country and it combines information on average years of schooling for
the working age population with return rates to education.
The share of total taxes in GDP is as reported in the OECD Revenue Statistics
database (OECD 2017).
The share of corporate taxes in GDP is obtained directly from the OECD Revenue
Statistics database. It corresponds to the ratio of the revenue from taxes on income,
profits and capital gains of corporations (tax category 1200) over total GDP in a given
year.
The corporate tax ratio is also obtained directly from the OECD Revenue Statistics
database. It corresponds to the ratio of the revenue from taxes on income, profits and






where T otalT ax denotes revenue from all tax categories and T ax1200 denotes tax
revenue from tax category 1200, which is taxes on income, profits and capital gains
of corporations.
The broad capital tax ratio is calculated based on data from the OECD Revenue
Statistics and the Penn World Table, Version 9.0. It corresponds to the ratio of revenue
from several taxes levied on capital over total tax revenue in a given year. The selection
of taxes is based on Volkerink and de Haan (2001), and it includes taxes on capital
income of individuals, taxes on corporate income, profits and capital gains as well as
investment goods, and all forms of property taxation. Specifically, in terms of the tax
categories of the OECD database, our broad capital tax ratio is calculated according
to the formula:
tcap2 =
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In the formula, α corresponds to the labor share of income, as reported in Penn World
Table, Version 9.0, T otalT ax denotes revenue from all tax categories, and T ax1100
denotes tax revenue from tax category 1100 while the same applies to the other terms
in the numerator.
The effective average capital tax rate is calculated based on data from the OECD
Revenue Statistics and the Penn World Table, Version 9.0. It corresponds to the ratio
of revenue from several taxes levied on capital over a measure of capital income in a
given year. The selection of taxes is based again on Volkerink and de Haan (2001). It
includes the same taxes on capital income of individuals, taxes on corporate income,
profits and capital gains as well as investment goods, and all forms of property taxation.
Specifically, in terms of the tax categories of the OECD database, our effective average
capital tax rate is calculated according to the formula:
tcap3 =
(1 − α) · T ax1100 + T ax1200 + T ax4000 + T ax5125 + T ax5212 + T ax6100
Capital I ncome
.
α denotes the labor share of income, as reported in Penn World Table, Version 9.0 and
Capital I ncome is measured as the residual share (1−α) of nominal GDP. T ax1100
again denotes tax revenue from tax category 1100 and the same applies to the other
terms in the numerator.
The top marginal corporate tax rate corresponds to the top statutory tax rate
imposed by the central government of each country on corporate income excluding
eventual surcharges on distributed profits. The data come from Oxford University’s
Centre for Business Taxation Database (Centre for Business Taxation 2017). To max-
imize the coverage of the data we also interpolate missing values in the data based on
a linear trend.
The effective marginal corporate tax rate is obtained also from Oxford Univer-
sity’s Centre for Business Taxation Database. These rates are computed following
the methodology of Devereux et al. (2002) The coverage of the data is extended by
interpolating missing values in the data based on a linear trend.
The narrow labor tax ratio is calculated based on data from the OECD Revenue
Statistics and the Penn World Table, Version 9.0. It corresponds to the ratio of taxes
on labor income of individuals over total tax revenue in a given year and it is given by
the formula:
t lab1 =
α · T ax1100
T otalT ax
.
In the formula α corresponds to the labor share of income, as reported in Penn
World Table, Version 9.0, T otalT ax denotes revenue from all tax categories, and
T ax1100 denotes tax revenue from tax category 1100, which is taxes on income,
profits and capital gains of individuals.
The broad labor tax ratio is calculated based on data from the OECD Revenue
Statistics and the Penn World Table, Version 9.0. It corresponds to the ratio of revenue
from several taxes levied on labor over total tax revenue in a given year. The selection
of taxes is based on Volkerink and de Haan (2001) and it includes taxes on labor
income of individuals, taxes on security contributions of employees and employers,
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and all payroll and workforce taxes. Specifically, in terms of the tax categories of the
OECD database, our broad labor tax ratio is calculated according to the formula:
t lab2 =
α · T ax1100 + T ax2100 + T ax2200 + T ax3000
T otalT ax
.
In the formula α corresponds to the labor share of income, as reported in Penn World
Table, Version 9.0, T otalT ax denotes revenue from all tax categories, and T ax1100
denotes tax revenue from tax category 1100 while the same applies to the other terms
in the numerator.
The effective average labor tax rate is calculated based on data from the OECD
Revenue Statistics and the Penn World Table, Version 9.0. It corresponds to the ratio
of revenue from several taxes levied on labor over a measure of labor income in a
given year. The selection of taxes is based again on Volkerink and de Haan (2001). It
includes the same taxes on labor income of individuals, taxes on security contributions
of employees and employers, and all payroll and workforce taxes, as in the broad labor
tax ratio. Specifically, in terms of the tax categories of the OECD database, our effective
average labor tax rate is calculated according to the formula:
t lab3 =
α · T ax1100 + T ax2100 + T ax2200 + T ax3000
Labor I ncome
.
α denotes the labor share of income, as reported in Penn World Table, Version
9.0 and Labor I ncome is measured the corresponding share α of nominal GDP.
T ax1100 again denotes tax revenue from tax category 1100 and the same applies
to the other terms in the numerator.
The narrow consumption tax ratio is calculated based on data from the OECD
Revenue Statistics. It corresponds to the ratio of general taxes on goods and services





T otalT ax denotes revenue from all tax categories and T ax5110 denotes tax revenue
from tax category 5110, which is general taxes on goods and services.
The broad consumption tax ratio is calculated based on data from the OECD
Revenue Statistics. It corresponds to the ratio of revenue from several taxes levied on
consumption over total tax revenue in a given year. The selection of taxes is based on
Volkerink and de Haan (2001), and it includes general taxes on goods and services,
excise taxes, taxes on profits of fiscal monopolies, customs and import duties as well as
taxes on specific services and use of goods. Specifically, in terms of the tax categories
of the OECD database, our broad consumption tax ratio is calculated according to the
formula:
tcon2 =
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T otalT ax denotes revenue from all tax categories, and T ax5110 denotes tax revenue
from tax category 5110 while the same applies to the other terms in the numerator.
The effective average consumption tax rate is calculated based on data from the
OECD Revenue Statistics and the Penn World Table, Version 9.0. It corresponds to the
ratio of revenue from several taxes levied on consumption over a measure of private
and public consumption spending in a given year. The selection of taxes is based
again on Volkerink and de Haan (2001). It includes the same taxes, as in the broad
consumption tax ratio, namely general taxes on goods and services, excise taxes, taxes
on profits of fiscal monopolies, customs and import duties as well as taxes on specific
services and use of goods. In terms of the tax categories of the OECD database, our
effective average consumption tax rate is calculated according to the formula:
tcon3 =
T ax5110 + T ax5121 + T ax5122 + T ax5123 + T ax5126 + T ax5128 + T ax5200
C + G .
Here C and G denote private and public consumption spending in current prices, as
reported in Penn World Table, Version 9.0. T ax5110 again denotes tax revenue from
tax category 5110 and the same applies to the other terms in the numerator.
The Gini coefficients are obtained from version 3.4 of the World Income Inequality
Database (UNU-WIDER 2017). As for some countries the database reports multiple
Gini coefficients from different sources for the same year, in these cases we take the
average of the available values. To eliminate also gaps in the series, we also interpolate
missing values based on a linear trend.
Section C: Additional regression results
This section provides additional regression results which were mentioned in the main
text but with the details being omitted.
Robustness checks with additional controls
To assess the robustness of our main findings in this section, we document how the
estimation results for our main specification change when we include in it a number
of important additional controls. These controls include variables that are likely to
influence the relationship between capital taxation and economic growth. For this
exercise, we focus on the specification from Table 2 that we use most frequently in
the paper which interacts the capital taxation measure with the low-income dummy.
We estimate this specification separately for each of our three main capital taxation
measures and in all cases we use our full sample of countries. The estimation results
are presented in Table 7.
Columns 1, 4 and 7 present the estimation results when we include the Gini coef-
ficient as an additional control. This allows us to account for the potential effect that
income inequality may have on the relationship between capital taxation and eco-
nomic growth. In all three columns, we see that the estimates for the Gini coefficient
are negative and statistically significant. This suggests that a higher level of income
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inequality exerts a negative influence on rates of economic growth. Yet, even when
controlling for that effect in all three columns we see that our finding remains intact.
The baseline effect of capital taxation on growth remains positive for high-income
countries and the interaction effect for low-income countries is in all cases negative
and statistically significant.
Columns 2, 5 and 8, present the estimation results when we control for a measure
of labor taxation. The exact measure of labor taxation that we employ in each of the
three columns follows the respective measure of capital taxation. Thus, in column 2
we control for a narrow measure of the labor tax ratio, reflecting just personal income
taxes of individuals, in column 5 we control for a broader labor tax ratio and in column
8 we control for the effective average rate of labor taxation. The exact description of
all three measures is provided in “Section B” above.
In all three cases, we do not see that the inclusion of these controls dramatically
alters our main findings. Moreover, the coefficient estimates that we obtain for our labor
tax measure in columns 2 and 5 are statistically insignificant. Only in column 8, we
see a clear negative and statistically significant relationship between the effective rate
of labor taxation and economic growth, suggesting that high rates of labor taxation are
growth retarding. Controlling for this effect slightly weakens the positive association
between capital taxation and economic growth for high income countries and makes
the corresponding one for low-income countries more negative. Yet, qualitatively it
does not alter our main finding.
Columns 3, 6 and 9, present the estimation results when we control for a measure
of consumption taxation. Again in this case, we use three measures of consumption
taxation that match with our employed measures of capital taxation. In column 3, we
control for a narrow consumption tax ratio, reflecting just general taxes on good and
services, in column 6 we control for a broader consumption tax ratio, and in column
9 we control for the effective average rate of consumption taxation.
In parallel to the results that we obtain for labor taxation, we find the estimates for
both the narrow and the broad consumption tax ratio to be statistically insignificant
and not to change the estimates for main regressors. However, for the effective rate
of consumption taxation we find it to be positively associated with growth rates.
Controlling for this effect, as can be seen, slightly strengthens the positive association
between capital taxation and economic growth for high-income countries and makes
it more negative for low-income countries. Qualitatively, though, it does not alter our
main findings.
Beyond controlling for these variables, in regressions that we do not report here,
we have also checked how our estimation results are potentially affected by the inclu-
sion of other related variables. In particular, we have considered the role of political
institutions, proxied by a country’s polity score, the role of economic institutions,
proxied by the ICRG quality of governance index, and the role of a country’s level of
economic freedom, proxied by Heritage Foundation’s economic freedom index. In all
cases, however, we found the coefficient estimates for these additional variables to be
statistically insignificant and their inclusion not to alter our findings in any important
way.
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Robustness checks with alternative thresholds
As a further check on our main findings, in this subsection we also explore how our
estimation results change when we consider alternative threshold effects that go beyond
the simple low-income dummy on which we focus in most of our regression tables.
Specifically, for our main specification with the binary threshold dummy we consider
three alternative dummies separating our sample of countries based on (a) their share
of total tax revenue in GDP, (b) their effective average rate of labor taxation, and (c)
their effective average rate of consumption taxation. As in the previous subsection,
we perform this robustness check for all three main measures of capital taxation.
For the purpose of this estimation, we follow the same approach as with the esti-
mation of the threshold for our main regression specification. This means that we
first estimate a threshold regression for our balanced sub-sample where we allow the
effect of capital taxation to vary with each country’s share of total taxation in GDP, its
effective labor taxation rate and its effective consumption taxation rate. Based on the
estimated threshold value, we construct a dummy variable for our full sample of coun-
tries and explore whether the effect of capital taxation on growth varies for countries
above and below that threshold.
The resulting estimates, presented in Table 8, provide some evidence that the hetero-
geneity in the effect of capital taxation on growth across countries is linked with their
tax structure. In all cases, we find the estimated interaction effects to be negative. Yet,
only in the case of the dummy variables based on total taxation and labor taxation we
find a statistically significant interaction term with any of our three main measures of
capital taxation. Specifically, the estimation results suggest that an increase in capital
taxation tends to have a positive effect on growth in countries where overall taxation is
high and where the effective rate of labor taxation is relatively high. For the effective
rate of consumption taxation, though, we do not find clear evidence that it influences
the relationship between capital taxation and economic growth. These results imply
that a shift of the tax burden toward capital can indeed be beneficial particularly in
countries where the tax burden is already high and labor is taxed at high rates.
Section D: Model derivations and proofs
This section presents the derivations for the stationary equilibrium of our model and
the proofs omitted from the main text.
Determination of stationary equilibrium
In the stationary equilibrium of our model economy variables {At , Kt , Yt , Ct , Dt ,
t , wt } grow at a balanced rate, variables {Lt , rt , μt , at } are constant, variables
{τ k, τ l , τπ , G0} are fixed by policy and variables {a0, A0, K0} are predetermined. In
order to fully characterize the equilibrium, we first solve for the constant equilibrium
value of Lt , the constant per effective worker values of {kt , yt , ct }, where xt ≡ XtAt Lt ,
and the long-run growth rate g∗ which equals the rate of productivity growth. The key
equations to determine these values are (13), (17), (18), (19) and (21) and (20). The
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Is capital taxation always harmful for economic growth? 801
remaining endogenous variables can be determined by (14), (7) and (9). Dividing both
sides with At Lt , (13) can be simply rewritten as:
yt = (kt )α. (23)










(1 − α)(1 − τ l)yt = ω(Lt )1+ψct . (25)
Finally, substituting Gt = At G0 in both (19) and (21), noting again (14) and rewriting











1 − αη − 1
η
)




Eliminating the ratio At+1At from both (24) and (27) based on (20) allows us to determine
the equilibrium values of {kt , yt , ct } and Lt given G0. Substituting these values in (20)
pins down the long-run growth rate.
Proof of Lemma 1
The proof follows as in Aghion et al. (2013). In a stationary equilibrium with balanced
growth, it must be that consumption makes up a constant share of output. Letting ct =
ρyt , noting that δ = 1 and replacing ct+1 and ct in (24) we get that: kt+1 At+1 Lt+1At Lt =
β(1−τ k)α
η
yt . We then substitute the resulting expression into (27) together with (26).
Similar algebraic manipulation of the resulting equation, letting ct = ρyt and noting
that δ = 1, yields: ρ = 1 − α
η
(η − 1 + β) − α
η
(1 − β)τ k − (1 − α)τ l .
Letting ct = ρyt in (25) and solving the resulting expression for Lt yields:
L∗ = [ (1−α)(1−τ l )
ωρ
] 11+ψ . Using again expression kt+1 At+1 Lt+1At Lt = β(1 − τ k)αη yt noting





equilibrium value of y∗ follows directly from (23). unionsq
Proof of Lemma 2
The proof also follows as in Aghion et al. (2013). Under the assumption that η ≥ 1+γ









(1−β)τ k−(1−α)τ l ] }
1
1+ψ
and k¯(η) is implicitly defined by k¯[1+α (η−1)2
η

(G0)ϕ(k¯)α L¯(η)] = β(1−τ k)αη (k¯)α.
Taking a second-order Taylor approximation of g¯(η) around η = 1 implies that
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dη2 |η=1. Noting that g¯(1) = 0, dg¯dη |η=1 = 0
and d
2 g¯
dη2 |η=1 = 2α
(G0)ϕ[αβ(1 − τ k)]
α
1−α { (1−α)(1−τ l )
ω[1−αβ−α(1−β)τ k−(1−α)τ l ] }
1
1+ψ yields the
expression of interest. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 3
To establish the first part of the proposition, use Eq. (26) to solve for τ l as an implicit
function τ k . Applying the implicit function theorem, compute dτ ldτ k and note that
limτ k−→0 dτ
l
dτ k = −α(1−α)(1−β)τ
l−α(1+η)(1−τ l )[1−αβ−(1−α)τ l ]
(1−α)(1+η)[1−αβ−(1−α)τ l ] < 0. Differentiating Eq.
(22) with respect to τ k , while treating τ l as a function of τ k yields:
dg¯
dτ k
|τ l = (η − 1)2α




(1 − α)(1 − τ l)





α(1 − β)(1 − τ l) − α(1 − β)(1 − τ k) dτ ldτ k




1 − τ k
⎤
⎦ .
Taking the limit of dg¯dτ k as τ
k −→ 0 and using the above derived expression for
limτ k−→0 dτ
l
dτ k implies that sign{ dg¯dτ k |τ l } = sign{G(τ l)} where G(τ l) ≡ (1 + η)[1 −
αβ − (1 − α)τ l ][α(1 − α)(1 − β)2τ l − (1 − τ l)] + (1 − β)(1 − τ l). As G ′(τ l) >
0, while G(0) < 0 and G(1) > 0, there exists τˆ l ∈ (0, 1) such that if τ l > τˆ l then
limτ k−→0
dg¯
dτ k > 0.
To establish the second part of the proposition, use Eq. (26) to solve for G0 and




|G0 = (η − 1)2α





(1 − α)(1 − τ l)
ω[1 − αβ − α(1 − β)τ k − (1 − α)τ l ]
] 11+ψ (1+ϕ) {( αϕ





(1 + ψ)[1 − αβ − α(1 − β)τ k − (1 − α)τ l ] −
1
(1 − α)(1 − τ k)
]}
.
Taking the limit of dg¯dτ k as τ
k −→ 0 and simplifying the resulting expression leads to
sign{ dg¯dτ k |G0} = sign{H(τ l)} with H(τ l) ≡ ϕ[(1 − αβ) + η(1 − αβ) − (1 + η)(1 −
α)τ l ] − τ l(1 + ϕ)[α + β + η(1 − αβ) − (1 + η)(1 − α)τ l ]. Let τ˜ l be the value for
which H ′(τ˜ l) = 0. As H ′(0) < 0, then τ˜ l > 0. As H(0) > 0, then it must be that
limτ k−→0
dg¯
dτ k |G0 > 0 for all τ l < τ˜ l . unionsq
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